I have another explanation: maybe the economy is not really that overheated.
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"In March 2009 he told his Fed colleagues that he was “quite uncomfortable with the idea of purchasing long-term Treasuries in size” because “if the Fed is perceived to be monetizing debt and serving as a buyer of last resort in the name of lowering risk-free rates, we could end up with higher rates and less credibility as a central bank.”"The Fed should hold off on more stimulus in the worst recession in 75 years because it might actually end up with higher rates and lose credibility? Why wouldn't the Fed lose credibility if it was perceived as not fighting the recession? Warsh continued to warn about the dangers of both monetary and fiscal stimulus in 2010.
"recent data is consistent with the view that persistently low nominal interest rates do not increase inflation - this just makes inflation low. If a central bank is persistently undershooting its inflation target, the solution - the neo-Fisherian solution - is to raise the nominal interest rate target. Undergraduate IS/LM/Phillips curve analysis may tell you that central banks increase inflation by reducing the nominal interest rate target, but that's inconsistent with the implications of essentially all modern mainstream macroeconomic models, and with recent experience."
We study editorial decision-making using anonymized submission data for four leadingThe interpretation of course hinges on whether you think more famous authors are likely to get cited more conditional on quality. To some extent, this must be true. You can't cite a paper you don't know about, and you're almost certainly more likely to know about a famous author's paper. This is part of the reason I started blogging -- as a marketing tool.
economics journals... We match papers to the publication records of authors at the time of submission and to subsequent Google Scholar citations.... Empirically, we find that referee recommendations are strong predictors of citations, and that editors follow the recommendations quite closely. Holding constant the referees' evaluations, however, papers by highly-published authors get more citations, suggesting that referees impose a higher bar for these authors, or that prolific authors are over-cited. Editors only partially offset the referees' opinions, effectively discounting the citations of more prolific authors in their revise and resubmit decisions by up to 80%. To disentangle the two explanations for this discounting, we conduct a survey of specialists, asking them for their preferred relative citation counts for matched pairs of papers. The responses show no indication that prolific authors are over-cited and thus suggest that referees and editors seek to support less prolific authors.